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Abstract
In Europe, when an imbalance between demand and capacity is detected for air traﬃc network resources,
Air Traﬃc Flow Management slots are allocated to ﬂights on the basis of a First Planned First Served
principle. We propose a market mechanism to allocate such slots in the case of a single constrained en-route
sector or airport. We show that our mechanism provides a slot allocation which is economically preferable to
the current one as it enables airlines to pay for delay reduction or receive compensations for delay increases.
We also discuss the implementation of our mechanism through two alternative distributed approaches that
spare airlines the disclosure of private information. Both these approaches have the additional advantage
that they directly involve airlines in the decision making process. Two computational examples relying on
real data illustrate our ﬁndings.
Keywords:Air Transportation, Market Mechanism Design, Air Traﬃc Flow Management slots, Collaborative
Decision Making, SESAR.
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: L93, C61, C71, L98
1 Introduction
In Europe, the Air Traﬃc Management (ATM) authority usually imposes a regulation when an imbalance
between predicted traﬃc and available capacity is detected in either a sector or an airport on the day of
operations. A regulation consists in forcing delays to the take-oﬀs of some ﬂights, the so-called Air Traﬃc
Flow Management (ATFM) delays. ATFM delays are imposed on the basis of a concept of equity but without
regarding the airlines’ costs. The ATM authority allocates a departure time slot (ATFM slot) to ﬂights through
a First Planned First Served (    ) policy, i.e., according to the ﬂights’ Estimated Time Over (ETO) the
speciﬁc sector or airport.
In this paper, we assume that airlines are interested in paying for delay reductions or receiving compensations
for delay increases (Vossen and Ball, 2006). Then, we introduce a market mechanism that allows airlines to
trade their     -allocated slots. Our mechanism is distributed as a centralized policy based on the airlines’
costs cannot be implemented unless the ATM authority knows the delay costs for each ﬂight. Unfortunately,
airlines consider these costs as private and valuable information, and are reluctant to disclose them even to the
ATM authority. Our mechanism let airlines decide autonomously for each ﬂight whether it is preferable to keep
the slot obtained by the      policy or to exchange it at the market price.
1Models for the optimal allocation of ATFM delays at a single airport were ﬁrst conceptualized by Odoni
(1987) for the deterministic case and successively by Andreatta and Romanin-Jacur (1987) for the stochastic
case. Later, Vranas et al. (1994) generalized these models to the multi-airport case. Bertsimas and Stock
Patterson (1998) and Bertsimas et al. (2008) proposed integer programming models considering also en-route
constraints and re-routing options. Other models appeared in the 1990s (see, e.g., the overview in Hoﬀman and
Ball, 1997). In all of them the ATM authority acts as the only decision maker optimizing a ‘global’ objective
function that aggregates all the delay costs caused by the ATFM regulations.
In the recent years, the European authorities have recognized that airlines are in the best position to make
decisions for their ﬂights (see, e.g., EUROCONTROL EEC, 1999). This principle has induced both U.S. and
European ATM regulators to introduce Collaborative Decision Making (CDM) programs (Chang et al., 2001;
EUROCONTROL, 2006). The idea of CDM is to move away from a central decision maker to ‘real-time’ decision
support tools that assist traﬃc managers and airline operational centers in making the best decisions. The CDM
concept is a pillar of SESAR, the Single European Sky ATM Research program of the European Union. Our
research falls within the scope of SESAR program, which states that airlines will be oﬀered the possibility to
indicate to an ATM authority a priority order for ﬂights aﬀected by delays (SESAR Joint Undertaking, 2007).
This User Driven Prioritisation Process (UDPP) will be initiated by the ATM authority when an unexpected
imbalance between capacity and demand is detected on a short notice. Since diﬀerent airlines are in general
competitors, market-based mechanisms seem natural ways of implementing the UDPP. A market mechanism
suitable for the UDPP should satisfy the following properties to be acceptable (see e.g. Krishna (2009) for
formal deﬁnitions):
∙ Individual rationality: the mechanism gives each airline a non-negative payoﬀ for participating in it,
otherwise no rational airline would participate without being enforced by the regulator. This property is
sometimes also called participation constraint.
∙ Budget balance: the mechanism neither requires subsidization from outside nor produces proﬁt to allocate
outside the set of airlines involved. The overall amount of prices paid and received by participants sums
up to zero. The central authority only objective is implementing the mechanism without injecting or
receiving money to make it work.
We consider the above properties as hard constraints that the market mechanism must satisfy. In fact all
airlines must derive a non-negative proﬁt from the participation while the central authority objective is merely
to facilitate the execution of the mechanism, without neither collecting nor injecting money. Thus all rational
agents, whose objective is to maximize proﬁts and the central authority, whose objective is the social welfare,
will want to participate in the mechanism. Other desirable properties are:
∙ Allocative eﬃciency: the mechanism produces an allocation which optimizes the sum of the costs reported
by the airlines.
∙ Incentive compatibility: the mechanism is designed so that no airline can increases its payoﬀ by misrep-
resenting its costs, provided that all other airlines are truthful.
The minimal value of allocative eﬃciency can be achieved only if costs are reported truthfully, i.e. only in an
incentive compatible mechanism. Unfortunately, the impossibility theorem by Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983)
states that no mechanism can satisfy at the same time incentive compatibility, individually rationality, budget
balance and eﬃciency at the equilibrium. The mechanism we propose thus relaxes the incentive compatibility
constraint in order to guarantee individual rationality and budget balance and it implements the eﬃcient
allocation according to reported costs.
To the authors’ knowledge, the literature on market mechanisms for slot allocation has been focusing so far
on airport slots only. Airport slots are agreed between coordinated airports and airlines and deﬁne the scheduled
times of arrivals or departures on a given date. Diﬀerently, the ATFM slots we deal with are used as a tactical
tool to regulate air traﬃc. In Europe, airport slots are free and their allocation follows the ‘grandfather’ rule.
Airlines can keep their slots year after year provided that their rate of utilization is above a given threshold
(see, e.g., Sieg (2009) and Verhoef (2009) for recent analyses on diﬀerent regulatory schemes for this market).
2Rassenti et al. (1982) propose a sealed-bid type of combinatorial auction for the long-term strategic allocation
of airport slots in the US. The slot prices are set by the ATM authority on the basis of bids submitted and in
order to maximize the system surplus. After this initial slot allocation, a secondary market is allowed, in which
airlines trade the slots previously received. This mechanism requires the revelation of airlines information to
calculate the ﬁrst allocation, and assigns the revenues from the auction to airports. Authors recognize that
this latter point is debatable since airports with limited capacity would rise their revenues by imputing rents
on scarce commodities. Fukui (2009) provides an empirical analysis of the current secondary market at four
major US airports. Also Ball et al. (2006) observe that US airport slots are scarce commodities with both a
private and a common value. They provide a deep analysis of the objectives and issues associated with slot
auctions at diﬀerent planning levels, from the strategic to the tactical one. They observe that one argument
against auctions is that they can be seen as a way for the government to raise revenues, since airlines should
pay to get the same slots that they now receive at no cost. Our market mechanism overcome this drawback
since it takes the      allocated slots as initial endowment of each ﬂight and enforces individual rationality
and budget balance. However, we must require that no compensation is given for canceled ﬂights that release
their slot, to prevent the creation of ‘ghost’ ﬂights just to make money.
Recently Waslander et al. (2008) have considered the case in which competitor airlines have diﬀerent private
preferences over traﬃc control actions. They formalize a capacity resource market for the air traﬃc and they
prove that the outcome of such market mechanism is to be preferred by all airlines over a solution that does not
take into account preference information. We rather start our work from a formalization of the system currently
adopted in Europe to allocate ATFM slots and then we suggest an implementation of a market mechanism,
which can be employed to enhance this solution.
The remainder of this paper unfolds as follows. In Section 2, we provide an overview of the slot allocation
mechanism currently used in Europe and we show that it minimizes the total ﬂight delays. In Section 3, we
introduce an individual rational and budget balanced mechanism that maximizes the eﬃciency. We show that
the resulting slot allocation minimizes the cost of the overall delays of the airlines involved in the trading.
To prevent the disclosure of private information and reduce computational and communication burdens, in
Section 4, we suggest two diﬀerent approaches to implement our market mechanism in a distributed fashion.
Then, in Section 5, we provide two examples based on real data. In Section 6, we draw some conclusions.
2 The current European resource allocation system
In Europe, when an imbalance between demand and availability of air transport infrastructure is detected, the
EUROCONTROL Central Flow Management Unit (CFMU) may employ a number of measures to avoid con-
gestion such as: the reconﬁguration of some sectors, the activation of mandatory routes for certain trajectories,
and the creation of slot allocation regulations (Leal de Matos and Omerod, 2000). In this last case, the aim is to
protect a certain resource of the system by limiting, through a regulation, the maximum number of ﬂights that
can enter it during an established period of time. On the day of operations all ﬂights aﬀected by regulations
can either decide to re-route, in order to avoid the aﬀected areas, or to be delayed on the ground by a controlled
take-oﬀ time. This measure is based on the principle that delays on the ground are safer and less costly than
those in the air. Any forecast delay somewhere in the system is anticipated at the departure airport prior to
the take-oﬀ (Ball and Lulli, 2004). The ATFM slots are calculated by the Computer Assisted Slot Allocation
(CASA) system at CFMU on a      policy (EUROCONTROL CFMU, 2007). To do so, initially, CASA
creates for each resource (i.e., an en-route sector or an airport) a slot allocation list. This list is composed by
a number of slots function on the rate of acceptance and the duration of the regulation. Then, CASA allocates
the slots to ﬂights as close to their ETO as possible. If two ﬂights require the same slot, the slot is allocated to
the one with the lower ETO. If a ﬂight is aﬀected by several regulations, the delay caused by the most penalizing
one is forced in all the others. Delays caused by ATFM measures in 2007 amounted to 21.5M minutes, causing
an estimated cost of e1300M to the airlines (EUROCONTROL PRC, 2008).
Even though a ﬂight may cross several regulations during its trajectory, most of the ATFM delays are caused
by just one regulation, meaning that there is a unique capacity constrained resource the ﬂight planned to use.
This paper focuses only on the latter scenario. Table 1 displays the number of regulations each regulated ﬂight
was aﬀected in the 28 day period from 31   July 2008 to 27 ℎ August 2008.
3Number of Regulations Number of Flights aﬀected % of Flights aﬀected
1 162991 68.730 %
2 50248 21.189 %
3 16865 7.112 %
4 5150 2.172 %
5 1432 0.604 %
6 358 0.151 %
7 86 0.036 %
8 13 0.005 %
9 3 0.001 %
Table 1: Flights delayed by number of regulations during AIRAC 311
The case of interest of this paper assumes that all the considered ﬂights are aﬀected by a single regulation
on a unique resource and that each ﬂight belongs to a diﬀerent airline. Thus, in the following, we may use ﬂight
and airline as synonyms. Diﬀerently, it is out of the scope of this work to study the situation where each airline
may own more than one ﬂight and must take decisions on how to allocate its set of slots to its set of ﬂights (see,
e.g., Vossen and Ball, 2006).
We consider a single capacity-constrained resource   active from         to          with a ﬁxed capacity
 , expressed in number of entries per hour. In addition, we have a set of ﬂights F= {1,..., } that must enter
 . The ATM authority must allocate a diﬀerent slot to each ﬂight   ∈   for the access to  . The    slots of
resource  , with
   =
 





are deﬁned as follows. Let   = {1,...,  } be the set of slots. Each slot   ∈ S has capacity equal to one ﬂight,
begins at time    and ends at time    where:
   =
 
        + (  − 1) ⋅ 60
 
 
with   ∈ {2,...,  }
   =   +1 − 1 with   ∈ {1,..,   − 1},
and  1 =        ,    =         .
Each ﬂight   ∈ F has a published trajectory which contains the ETO    into  . Then, ﬂight   can be
allocated to any slot   ∈   , where    = {  :    ≤   } ⊆   is the set of the feasible slots for ﬂight   as they
end after   . The allocation of ﬂight   to slot   produces a delay     equal to
    = max{  ,  } −    ∀  ∈  ,∀  ∈  .
Given the above data, the ATM authority decides the slot allocations. This operations is equivalent to
deciding the value of the decision variables    , for all   ∈   and   ∈   , where     is set equal to 1 if ﬂight  
is allocated to slot  , 0 otherwise.
The      slot allocation policy sorts ﬂights   ∈   by the ascending value of   , then greedily allocates
each ﬂight to the ﬁrst available slot, i.e.,     is set equal to 1 if
  =     min{   :    ≤    ∀  ∈   and   is not allocated yet}
Hereafter, we refer   as the vector whose components are the variables     and, in particular, we denote as   
a slot allocation obtained by means of the      policy.
4In the following, we show that the allocation    minimizes the total delay of the ﬂights in  , as required







       (1a)
 
 ∈ : ∈ f
    ≤ 1 ∀  ∈   (1b)
 
 ∈ f
    = 1 ∀  ∈   (1c)
    ≥ 0 ∀  ∈  ,  ∈   . (1d)
In (1), the objective function (1a) minimizes the total delay; constraints (1b) impose that at most one ﬂight
can enter   during each slot   ∈  , whereas constraints (1c) require that all ﬂights aﬀected by the regulation
must have a slot allocated; ﬁnally, constraints (1d) guarantee the integrality of the the decision variables    .
These last constraints can be expressed in their linearly relaxed form since (1) is an assignment problem.
Theorem 1 A vector    obtained respecting the      policy is optimal for problem (1).
Proof. By closing paralleling the proof of Theorem 3.2 in Vossen and Ball (2006) where all slots are composed
by only one unit of time, i.e.,    =    ∀  ∈  .
The      policy does not allow a ﬂight   to make any choice or state any preference about the slots. On
the other hand, the optimality of the      policy implies also its Pareto eﬃciency. Any other slot allocation
policy that reduces the delay of a given ﬂight   correspondingly increases the delay of at least another ﬂight
  ∕=  , that consequently would not ﬁnd convenient to move from its granted      slot.
A further perspective is available when we no longer consider delays only, but also the costs associated to
them, and we allow monetary payments to be involved. In this case it is possible to introduce an appropriate
reallocation policy such that all ﬂights may prefer a slot allocation diﬀerent from the      one, as we show
in the next section.
3 A market mechanism for slot allocation
We consider the possibility of a slot trade between ﬂights. We assume that ﬂights are willing either to pay for
earlier slots that reduce their delay or to receive a side payment to compensate possible increases of delays.
Let    be the vector representing the      slot allocation and let   represent an alternative feasible slot
allocation obtained by the market mechanism. In addition, let     be the delay cost of ﬂight   allocated to slot
 , for all   ∈   and   ∈   . Costs     vary depending on, e.g., the time of the day, the type of ﬂight (connecting
or not) and the type of airline. In general, they do not depend linearly on the amount of delay: the cost of a
few minutes of delay is proportionally much lower than, e.g., the cost of a 30-minute delay (Cook et al., 2004).
Finally, for all   ∈  , let    ≥ 0 be price of the slot  , i.e., the amount of money that the seller ﬂight receives
from the buyer ﬂight for this resource.
We deﬁne
   =
 
 ∈ f
    ⋅ (  
   −    ) +
 
 ∈ f
   ⋅ (  
   −    ) (2)
5as the proﬁt that ﬂight   ∈   obtains by exchanging the slot assigned through the      allocation with the
slot assigned by the alternative allocation. The former two terms of    represent the diﬀerence in the cost
of delay between the allocation of ﬂight   from the      slot to the alternative one. The latter two terms
represent the economic payoﬀ between the selling of its      slot and the purchase of the alternative slot.
The ﬁrst property that a market mechanism must fulﬁll is the individual rationality: each ﬂight   partici-
pating to the trade must obtain a non negative   , i.e.,
   ≥ 0, ∀  ∈  . (3)
Another attractive property is the budget balanced: the trade should neither require payments from outside





   ⋅ (  
   −    ) = 0. (4)
Finally, a market mechanism may be required to allocate the resource eﬃciently. From the society’s point
of view, it is desirable to minimize the overall cost of delay. This is equivalent to identify a new slot allocation
which maximizes the decrease of the total delay cost from the granted      allocation. On the other side,
airlines may wish to use the trading not only to minimize their costs of delay, but also to maximize their proﬁts.
However, from Equations (2) and (4) the two objectives coincide as
 
 ∈ 





    ⋅ (  
   −    ). (5)
Solving the following nonlinear problem we can obtain a slot allocation that satisﬁes the above desirable
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    ∈ {0,1} ∀  ∈  ,  ∈    (6f)
   ≥ 0 ∀  ∈  . (6g)
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 ∈ : ∈ f
    ≤ 1 ∀  ∈   (7b)
 
 ∈ f
    = 1 ∀  ∈   (7c)
    ≥ 0 ∀  ∈  ,  ∈   . (7d)
We denote as    the optimal solution of (7). As problems (1) and (7) share the same constraints,    is also
feasible for (1), but not necessarily optimal. Analogously,    is feasible for (7), but not necessarily optimal.
The optimal solution    of problem (7) is also optimal for problem (1) when all slots are composed by only one
unit of time, i.e.,    =   , for all   ∈   (see Theorem 3.1 in Vossen and Ball (2006)).
Deﬁnition 1 We deﬁne as         the policy that implements the slot allocation according to problem (7).
Deﬁnition 2 We deﬁne as MM the market mechanism where each ﬂight sells its granted      slot   at price
   and purchases the         slot   at price   .
The next theorem proves that MM fulﬁlls the individual rationality property.
Property 1 MM is individual rational if, for all   ∈  , the slots costs are    = −   where    are the nonpositive
dual variables associated to constraints (7b).
Proof. Let    be the nonpositive dual variables associated to constraints (7b) for all   ∈  , and    be the
dual variables associated to constraints (7c) for all   ∈  . The slackness conditions impose    +   ≤     where
the equality holds if   
   = 1. As a consequence, for   ∈   such that   
   = 1, we obtain
    −     +    −    ≥ 0, ∀  ∈   ∖ { }. (8)
Finally, observe that condition (8) becomes     =     −     +    −    ≥ 0, that is condition (3), when we let
   = −   for all   ∈   and we denote as   the slot allocated to   under the      policy.
The following two lemmas are necessary to prove that MM is also budget balanced.
Lemma 1 For every pair of slot allocation    and   , respectively deﬁned by the      and by the        
policy, a slot is empty in    if and only if it is empty in   .
Proof. By contradiction. Let ˆ   be the ﬁrst empty slot in one slot allocation but not in the other one. We
initially assume that ˆ   is empty in   , but is allocated in   . Let   , respectively   , be the set of the ﬂights
allocated to the slots 1,...,ˆ   in   , respectively in   . The minimality of ˆ   guarantees that    ∖    ∕= ∅.
Then consider a ﬂight ˆ   ∈    ∖   . In   , ﬂight ˆ   is allocated to a slot ˆ   > ˆ  . Deﬁne ˆ    such that
ˆ   




0 if   = ˆ   and   = ˆ  
1 if   = ˆ   and   = ˆ  
  
   otherwise
.
That is, ˆ    induces the same slot allocations of    except for ﬂight ˆ   which is allocated to slot ˆ   instead of
ˆ  . The feasibility of    and the fact that ˆ   is allocated to slot ˆ   in    imply the feasibility of ˆ   . Also the
7cost (7a) of    is strictly greater than the corresponding cost of ˆ    as   ˆ   ≤  ˆ   <  ˆ  . Hence, we obtain the
contradiction that    is not optimal for (7) and cannot be deﬁned by a         policy. As a consequence,
we cannot assume that ˆ   is empty in   , but not in   . An analogous argument proves that we cannot assume
that ˆ   is empty in   , but is allocated in   . Then, we must conclude that ˆ   cannot exist.
The above lemma implies that any slot allocated under the      policy is also allocated, possibly to a
diﬀerent ﬂight, under the         policy. Hence constraints (7b) can be rewritten as:
 
 ∈ : ∈ f
    =
 
 ∈ : ∈ f
  
   ∀  ∈  . (9)
Another important consequence of Lemma 1 is that the asymmetric assignment problem (7) can be decom-
posed into a set of smaller symmetric assignment problems. To prove this last statement, we need to introduce
the following notation. Let   and   be two empty slots in    such that    <   . We deﬁne as   
   ⊆   (re-
spectively   
   ⊆  ) the set of slots allocated in    (respectively in   ) between the empty slots   and  . Let
  
   ⊆   (respectively   
   ⊆  ) be the corresponding set of ﬂights assigned to the   
   (respectively   
  ) slots.
Lemma 2 For every pair of slot allocation    and   , respectively deﬁned by the      and by the        
policy, if   and   are two empty slots in    such that    <    and no other empty slots exists between   and  ,
then, a ﬂight is allocated to a slot between   and   in    if and only if it is allocated to a slot between the same
empty slots   and   also in   , that is   
   =   
   and   
   =   
   .
Proof. From Lemma 1, it follows that each element of   
   is allocated to a ﬂight also in the solution   ,
i.e.,   
   =   
  . Let   ∈   
   be a ﬂight allocated to slot ℎ in   
  , i.e.,  ℎ >    and  ℎ <   . It follows that
   >   , otherwise slot   would be occupied by ﬂight  . Hence also in    ﬂight   cannot be anticipated to
slot   or to any other slot earlier than slot  . Similarly no ﬂight assigned to a slot later than slot   can receive
slot ℎ, earlier than  , hence ﬂight   cannot be postponed in    to any free slot later than slot  . Thus, if in   
slot ℎ is allocated to a ﬂight preceding slot   in   , it follows that there must be an empty slot in    that was
not empty in   , and this contradicts Lemma 1. Hence, we must have that   
   =   
   . A symmetric argument
holds for the only if part of the statement.
The above lemma implies that the optimal         allocation    is achieved by minimizing the cost of
delay of each separate subset of consecutive allocated slots between two empty slots given by the      policy.
Or, the solution of the asymmetric assignment problem (7) is found by solving a sequence of smaller symmetric
assignment problems, one for each set   
  . A further consequence of Lemma 2 is that MM is budget balanced.
Property 2 MM is budget balanced.
Proof. The statement is an immediate consequence of the fact that   
   =   
   for any pair of slots   and  
considered in Lemma 2. Indeed,   
   =   
   implies that no ﬂight   ∈   
   must sell back its      assigned slot
to the ATM authority, nor any ﬂight   ∈   
   must buy an unassigned      slot from the ATM authority.
The ﬂights just sell and buy slots to and from each others.
Another consequence of Lemma 2 is that, from a game theoretic perspective, we can see MM as a permutation
game and then we can derive further characteristics.
A cooperative game with transferable utility, or TU game, is described (see, e.g., Borm et al., 2001) by a
pair ( , ) that is, by the set of players   = {1,..., } and a characteristic function   : 2  →  , being 2  the set
of subsets (usually referred as coalitions) of  . In these games side payments between the players are allowed
and the characteristic function assigns to every coalition   ⊆   a value  ( ), representing the maximal total
monetary reward that the members of this group can obtain when they cooperate. By convention,  (∅) = 0.
In this context, a permutation game (see, e.g., Curiel and Tijs, 1986) is a TU game describing a situation in
which the   players in   all have one job to be processed and one machine on which each job can be processed,
8but no machine is allowed to process more than one job. If player   processes his job on the machine of player
 , the processing costs are    . Then, the permutation game characteristic function is deﬁned as
 ( ) =
   
 ∈      − min ∈ΠA
 
 ∈     ( ) if ∅ ∕=   ⊆  
0 if   = ∅
(10)
where Π  is the class of all  -permutations. Here, the value of  ( ) denotes the maximal cost savings a coalition
  can obtain by processing their jobs according to an optimal schedule compared to the situation in which every
player processes his job on his own machine.
We can interpret MM as a permutation game since there is an immediate correspondence between ‘machine’
and ‘slot’ on one side, and between ‘job’ (or ‘player’) and ‘ﬂight’ on the other side. Accordingly, a subset of
ﬂights forms a coalition   if they limit the slot trading only to the slots assigned by the      policy to the
members of the coalition. Hence, imposing     =     for all   ∈   and   ∈  , the characteristic function  ( )
is equal to the diﬀerence between the cost of delay due to the      allocation and the         allocation
when limited to ﬂights in  . Under this latter hypothesis, condition (5) holds even when its sums are restricted
only to the members coalition  , then  ( ) is also equal to the maximum sum of proﬁts that the ﬂights of the
coalition can obtain by exchanging their slots.
In a TU game ( , ) a payoﬀ allocation   = ( 1, 2,...,  ) is the vector of the amounts of utility allocated
to each player. A payoﬀ allocation is individually rational if    ≥  ({ }) for all   ∈  , it is eﬃcient if  
 ∈     =  ( ). In this context, the imputation set ℐ( , ) of the game is the set of the payoﬀ allocations
that are eﬃcient and individually rational. Finally, the core  ( , ) ⊆ ℱ( , ) of the game, if it exists, is the
set of the payoﬀ allocations that are eﬃcient and coalition rational, that is
 
 ∈     ≥  ( ), for all   ⊆  .
Then if we deal with MM as a permutation game, the results in Curiel and Tijs (1986) state that the core
of the game exists and that there is a bijective relation between the elements of the core of the permutation
game and the optimal solutions of the dual problem of (7) provided that the objective function (7a) is replaced
by the equivalent function (6a). In particular, the proﬁts    as in Equation (2) deﬁne a core payoﬀ allocation.
Give the core characteristics, the next property follows.
Property 3 MM is coalition rational and deﬁnes Pareto optimal proﬁts whose overall value is equal to
 




 ∈ f    (  
   −   
  ).
The coalition rationality implies that, under the MM policy, no coalition   of ﬂights has an incentive to part
company with  ∖  and establish cooperation on its own.
In general, the dual of problem (7) may present multiple solutions and then multiple slot prices   , and hence
proﬁts   , can be determined. If the ATM authority centrally solves problem (7), it could select particular values
of    to make the payoﬀ allocations/proﬁts enjoy further properties such as being pairwise-monotonic (Miquel,
2008) to try to have that all ﬂights obtain non-null proﬁts.
It is important to note that there are some situations where a ﬂight may ﬁnd convenient to misrepresent its
true cost of delay to increase its payoﬀ, at the expense of other ﬂights, as shown in Appendix A. This is not
surprising due to the impossibility theorem of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983), since we require individual
rationality and budget balance constraints to hold.
4 Distributed market-based mechanisms
The practical implementation of the         policy requires each ﬂight   to communicate to the ATM
authority its complete set of values     for each slot   ∈   , in order to determine the optimal allocation and
the related payments. The optimal exchange is then calculated centrally according to this information, thus
implementing a single-round, sealed-bid type of exchange (de Vries and Vohra, 2003). This type of mechanism
9suﬀers from a) the high computational eﬀort for Airlines for calculating the complete sets of requests and the
value associated, b) the high communication cost of sending the complete set of values over a communication
network, c) the complete disclosure for Airlines of private information, which might be considered as private
values in a highly competitive environment as commercial aviation (Martin et al., 1998), and d) the lack of
dynamism, since all bids from participants must be communicated before a deadline. To overcome these draw-
backs, we propose a distributed market mechanism to reallocate the slots in accordance with the        
policy. This mechanism directly involves each airline in the decision process of the slot reallocation and does not
require the disclosure of the delay costs. As a side a eﬀect, it also puts the cost misrepresentation under a dif-
ferent perspective. When a centralized market mechanism as MM is implemented, an airline misrepresenting its
costs is actually lying to an authority that pursues a common objective and then should be possibly sanctioned.
On the contrary, when a distributed market mechanism is implemented, the same cost misrepresentation can
be seen as a part of a bargaining process where each airline pursues its own interest.
4.1 Lagrangian Relaxation
A classical dual decomposition can be used to transform the centralized allocation problem into a distributed
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As problem (7) is a continuous linear problem, the optimal Lagrangian multipliers  ∗
  in problem (11)
are equal to the optimal dual variables  ∗
  associated to constraints (9), i.e.,  ∗
  =  ∗
  ∀  ∈  . Hence when
the optimal Lagrangian multipliers are identiﬁed, the optimal value of function (11a) is equal to the optimal
value of function (7a) due to the complementary slackness conditions, and also all constraints (9) (or 7b), (7c)
and (7d) are satisﬁed. Then the optimal solution to problem (11) simultaneously allocates slots in accordance
with the         policy and computes all the optimal slot values  ∗
 . We further notice that the objective
function (11a) is separable into   functions, one for each ﬂight, and that constraints (11b) and (11c) are also
separable in term of ﬂights, thus allowing the decomposition of problem (11) into   subproblems. We now
exploit the above properties to show how to implement the market mechanism without requiring the ﬂights to
disclose their delay costs to the ATM authority.
The following iterative procedure, referred as    algorithm, determines an optimal solution for problem
(11). Given some tentative values   , for all the slots   ∈  , each ﬂight   solves its own subproblem:
 ∗
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 ∈ f
  (    −   
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 ∈ f
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Then, each ﬂight   communicates to the ATM authority its slot request  ∗
  = { ∗
  ,∀  ∈   } and the
ATM authority checks for compatibility of the set of requests  ∗ = { ∗
 ,∀  ∈  } with a feasible slot allocation,
where at most one ﬂight is allocated to each slot (constraints (7b)). If no feasible solution is found, the ATM
10authority updates the slot tentative values   . In particular, at each iteration the ATM authority sets slot
prices by increasing the value obtained at the previous iteration for an over-demanded slot and by decreasing it
for an unused one, always assigning a positive value, according to a subgradient algorithm (see, e.g., Bertsekas,
1999). If constraints (7b) on slot capacity are respected, slots are allocated according to the         policy.
Otherwise the current prices are communicated to ﬂights, which in turn solve again their local optimization
model (12) and answer with a new slot request  ∗
  = { ∗
  ,∀  ∈   } for all   ∈  . If a feasible solution
cannot be achieved after a pre-deﬁned number of iterations, then slots are allocated according to the     
policy. However, our computational experiments based on real instances easily converge, as described in the
next Section 5. Note that this procedure allows the ATM authority to allocate the slots without knowing the
delay costs. In fact, the knowledge of the delay costs is needed only for the solution of problem (12) that is
solved privately by each ﬂight.
4.2 Bertsekas’ Auction Algorithm
An alternative approach to implement the         policy in a distributed way is the Bertsekas’ Auction
Algorithm for the Assignment Problem (see, e.g., Bertsekas (1990)), referred in the following as    algorithm.
The    algorithm implements an iterative ascending type of auction, which employs both bid and ask prices
since bidders can increase slot prices proposed by the ATM authority, according to their valuation functions.
Here we sketch the main principles of this algorithm as described in Bertsekas (1991). The algorithm starts
with an empty assignment, i.e., all ﬂights are unallocated, proceeds iteratively and terminates when a feasible
assignment is reached. At each iteration the ATM authority proposes to one unallocated ﬂight   the current
slot prices    for all   ∈  . Then   announces the slot    that minimizes its cost function, i.e.,
   = argmin
 ∈ f
{    +   },
and proposes for this slot a higher bid price ˆ   f =   f +    where    ≥ 0 is the cost caused by being allocated
the second best slot rather than   , i.e.,    = min ∈ f: ∕= f{    +   } − min ∈ f{    +   }. The price of each
slot is set equal to the highest bid and it is allocated to the correspondent bidder. If another ﬂight was already
allocated to this slot at the beginning of the iteration, it becomes again unallocated. This procedure iteratively
continues until all ﬂights   ∈   have a slot allocated. When this condition holds, it has been proven (Bertsekas,
1991) that this allocation is also optimal for problem (7) and that the associated prices  ∗
  are equal to the
optimal dual solutions  ∗
  for all   ∈  .
The    algorithm allows to simultaneously allocate slots in accordance with the         policy and to
compute the optimal slot values  ∗
  in a distributed way as was the case for the    algorithm. In addition, the
   algorithm gives airlines a greater degree of control on the course of the auction, as it provides the possibility
for the airlines to actively set slot prices through their bids. However, if on one side, the    algorithm allows
a price discovery more actively driven by users, on the other, it requires that the airlines are able to calculate
their    values. In fact, each ﬂight internally calculates the bid price relying on the current slot values and
on its own cost of delay. Then from all unallocated ﬂights the ﬁnal bid prices only are communicated to the
ATM authority. In turn, the ATM authority only relying on these bid prices determines the new slot values
and passes them back to the remaining unallocated ﬂights. Diﬀerently, no internal computations are required
in the    setting.
5 Examples of application
In this section, we consider two case studies based on real operational data with aim of analyzing the perfor-
mances of the    and the    algorithms introduced in the previous section. Both algorithms takes advantage
of the fact that the asymmetric assignment problem (7) can be decomposed into a set of smaller symmetric
assignment problems as shown in Lemma 2.
11In the case of the    algorithm, we solved the real instances presented next using the  -Scaling Forward
version for a symmetric assignment problem which allows to avoid degeneracy and increase the computational
performance of the basic Auction Algorithm (see Section 4.1 in Bertsekas, 1991). Degeneracy occurs when a
ﬂight   is indiﬀerent in exchanging its      slot as this exchange gives no proﬁt to it, i.e.,    = 0. In such
a situation, to avoid cycling, the    algorithm sets the proﬁt    equal to −  with 0 <   < 1
∣ F
jk∣ (see Section
1.2.1 in Bertsekas, 1991).
For sake of simplicity and without loss of generality, in the following we assume that delay costs     are
proportional to the amount of delay, i.e.,     =    ∗     for all   ∈   and   ∈    where    > 0 is the cost
of one minute of delay. In particular, in both cases we assume that, for each ﬂight  , the tactical cost of one
minute of ground delay    is a stochastic variable uniformly distributed between e5 and e20 per minute, in
line with the ﬁgures provided in Cook et al. (2004).
5.1 Case A: en-route regulation
This case is representative of the situation in which several ﬂights are aﬀected by the same and unique regulation
limiting the maximum capacity on ATC en-route sector. This was the case, for instance, on the 2nd August
2008 between 04:00AM and 06:00AM, when a regulation was limiting the number of ﬂights entering the French
sector LFEERESMI to 14 per hour, for ATC capacity reasons. There were 18 ﬂights originally planned to enter
this sector at diﬀerent points in time between 4:18AM and 5:51AM. Given the baseline schedule obtained by
applying the      policy, we simulated the two distributed market mechanisms: by tuning the appropriate
parameters the    algorithm converges to an optimal solution after 25 iterations, and the    algorithm after
69 iterations.
Under the      policy, the overall delay is 91 minutes and the overall cost of delay is e1175. The
        policy provides a lower cost of delay (e736), but a slightly higher overall delay (93 minutes).
Table 2 shows the diﬀerent slots and their associated values for both algorithms. The slots in boldface are
the ones allocated to a ﬂight under both the      and the         policies. Table 3 displays the main
pieces of information associated to each ﬂight  . The second and the third column respectively report the cost
of the delay    and the estimated time of entry    into sector LFEERESMI. The fourth and the ﬁfth column
respectively show the optimal slot allocations    and    along with the exact time of entry into the sector.
Finally, the sixth and the seventh column respectively present the proﬁt obtained by each ﬂight using the   
and the    algorithm. We notice that the proﬁt of an individual ﬂight may change depending on the algorithm
as problem (7) may have multiple optimal dual solutions. However, the sum of all the proﬁts is constant (e439
= e1175 - e736) as shown by Equation (5). In Table 3 the ﬂights in boldface are the ones that do not exchange
the slot allocated to them under the      policy. In particular, holding Lemma 2, ﬂights 5, 17 and 18 cannot
move from their      slots.









S1 04:00 - 04:03 0 0 S15 05:00 - 05:03 222.78 392.52
S2 04:04 - 04:07 0 0 S16 05:04 - 05:07 168.32 326.87
S3 04:08 - 04:11 0 0 S17 05:08 - 05:11 126.49 271.47
S4 04:12 - 04:16 0 0 S18 05:12 - 05:16 90.20 234.47
S5 04:17 - 04:20 0 105.93 S19 05:17 - 05:20 45.28 194.07
S6 04:21 - 04:24 0 74.10 S20 05:21 - 05:24 21.11 170.15
S7 04:25 - 04:29 57.96 64.77 S21 05:25 - 05:29 0 159.23
S8 04:30 - 04:33 33.71 24.93 S22 05:30 - 05:33 0 0
S9 04:34 - 04:37 11.00 0.77 S23 05:34 - 05:37 0 0
S10 04:38 - 04:41 0 0 S24 05:38 - 05:41 0 0
S11 04:42 - 04:46 338.21 554.47 S25 05:42 - 05:46 0 0
S12 04:47 - 04:50 336.11 544.03 S26 05:47 - 05:50 0 0
S13 04:51 - 04:54 308.40 467.95 S27 05:51 - 05:54 0 0
S14 04:55 - 04:59 276.87 435.87 S28 05:55 - 05:59 0 0
Table 2: Slot Table - Case A (LFEERESMI)





Slot (Time) Slot (Time)
F1 16 04:18 S5 (04:18) S5 (04:18) 0 0
F2 17 04:24 S6 (04:24) S6 (04:24) 0 0
F3 8 04:25 S7 (04:25) S7 (04:25) 0 0
F4 6 04:26 S8 (04:30) S8 (04:30) 0 0
F5 6 04:36 S9 (04:36) S9 (04:36) 0 0
F6 14 04:44 S11 (04:44) S11 (04:44) 0 0
F7 9 04:45 S12 (04:47) S18 (05:12) 20.91 84.56
F8 6 04:46 S13 (04:51) S20 (05:21) 107.29 117.80
F9 19 04:47 S14 (04:55) S12 (04:47) 92.76 43.84
F10 10 04:48 S15 (05:00) S17 (05:08) 16.29 41.05
F11 16 04:53 S16 (05:04) S13 (04:53) 35.92 34.92
F12 13 04:54 S17 (05:08) S14 (04:55) 18.62 4.60
F13 17 05:00 S18 (05:12) S15 (05:00) 71.42 45.95
F14 15 05:04 S19 (05:17) S16 (05:04) 71.96 62.20
F15 7 05:12 S20 (05:21) S19 (05:17) 3.83 4.08
F16 11 05:24 S21 (05:25) S21 (05:25) 0 0
F17 18 05:37 S23 (05:37) S23 (05:37) 0 0
F18 8 05:51 S27 (05:51) S27 (05:51) 0 0
Table 3: Flight Table - Case A (LFEERESMI)
5.2 Case B: arrival airport regulation
This case is representative of the situation in which there is a limitation on the maximum number of ﬂights
arriving at an airport during a certain time period. We found that London City Airport (EGLC) was imposing
a regulation on the 4th August 2008, limiting the arrival rate to 18 ﬂight per hour, between 06:00AM and
07:30AM. This regulation was the only one aﬀecting 24 ﬂights. In this case, the    algorithm converges to an
optimal solution after 39 iterations, and the    algorithm after 38 iterations.
Under the      policy, the overall delay is 73 minutes and the overall cost of delay is e957. The
        policy provides a lower cost of delay (e631), but a slightly higher overall delay (77 minutes).
Table 4 shows the diﬀerent slots and their associated values for both algorithms. The slots in boldface are
the ones allocated to a ﬂight under both the      and the         policies. In Table 5 the second and
the third column respectively report the cost of the delay    and the estimated time of entry    at EGCL. The
fourth and the ﬁfth column respectively show the optimal slot allocations    and    along with the exact time
of entry. Finally, the sixth and the seventh column respectively present the proﬁt obtained by each ﬂight using
the    and the    algorithm. Clearly, the sum of all the proﬁts is constant (e326 = e957 - e631) as shown
by Equation (5). In Table 5 the ﬂights in boldface are the ones that do not exchange the slot allocated to them
under the      policy. In particular, holding Lemma 2, ﬂights 15 and 24 cannot move from their     
slots. Finally, this example shows a case where degeneracy occurs. According to the slot values computed with
the    algorithm, ﬂight F3 does not have any economic proﬁt in moving from slot S3 to S4. The resulting
negative proﬁt  3 = −0.06 is due to the introduction of the the perturbation constant   > 0 to prevent cycling,
and should be interpreted as zero, i.e.,  3 = 0.
6 Conclusions
This paper deals with the slot allocation problem for a single constrained Air Traﬃc Network resource, e.g.,
an en-route sector or an airport. The market mechanism proposed shows several characteristics that make it
preferable to the First Planned First Served policy, currently adopted in Europe to sequence ﬂights whenever
an imbalance between planned traﬃc and resource capacity occurs on the day of operations. First, it produces
a slot allocation that makes every ﬂight economically better oﬀ. High-valued ﬂights can reduce their delays
by acquiring resources while low-priority ﬂights may be reimbursed for the resources they relinquish. Second,
the ATM authority is neutral with respect to the ﬁnal outcome of the slot exchanges as it is not economically









S1 06:00 - 06:02 0 437.41 S15 06:46 - 06:49 27.78 125.51
S2 06:03 - 06:05 0 448.23 S16 06:50 - 06:52 0 0
S3 06:06 - 06:09 311.83 428.33 S17 06:53 - 06:55 133.04 34.56
S4 06:10 - 06:12 284.36 410.39 S18 06:56 - 06:59 116.96 20.67
S5 06:13 - 06:15 264.71 422.35 S19 07:00 - 07:02 105.26 46.56
S6 06:16 - 06:19 276.66 428.25 S20 07:03 - 07:05 73.31 16.67
S7 06:20 - 06:22 259.94 393.41 S21 07:06 - 07:09 105.23 209.56
S8 06:23 - 06:25 239.69 366.41 S22 07:10 - 07:12 88.46 200.67
S9 06:26 - 06:29 200.50 313.41 S23 07:13 - 07:15 71.61 187.78
S10 06:30 - 06:32 157.10 273.48 S24 07:16 - 07:19 46.60 173.89
S11 06:33 - 06:35 126.57 239.41 S25 07:20 - 07:22 0 0
S12 06:36 - 06:39 90.80 204.41 S26 07:23 - 07:25 0 0
S13 06:40 - 06:42 60.11 164.51 S27 07:26 - 07:29 0 0
S14 06:43 - 06:45 31.50 143.58 - - - -
Table 4: Slot Table - Case B (EGCL)
involved. In fact, it is not requested to subsidize the market players neither it can make any proﬁt from the
trading process. Third, under the above conditions the allocative eﬃciency is maximized both from the social
welfare and market players’ perspectives. Finally, the mechanism is distributed as it actively involves airlines in
the slot allocation process. They express their preferences over diﬀerent feasible solutions to the slot allocation
problem in the spirit of Collaborative Decision Making, as advocated by the SESAR operational concept.
This research may be generalized to the deﬁnition of a market-based policy for slot trading when ﬂights
are concerned with multiple regulated resources. The use of combinatorial exchanges seems to be a promising
approach to deal with this last complex problem.
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A Discussion on Incentive Compatibility
In the following we provide a simple example where a ﬂight may ﬁnd convenient to misrepresent its true cost
of delay to increase its payoﬀ, at the expense of other ﬂights.
Consider two ﬂights,  1 and  2, and two slots,   and  . Both ﬂights request slot  . Then we set  1  =  2  = 0.
We assume that 0 <  1  <  2  and that  1 <  2. The      policy allocates ﬂight  1 at slot   and ﬂight
 2 at slot  . Let  1 and  2 be the proﬁts of ﬂight  1 and  2, respectively, obtained by selling its      slot
and purchasing the other slot. We ﬁnally assume that ﬂights do not know the costs of delay of each other and
that the         policy is centrally implemented by the ATM authority through problem (7). We want to
investigate the opportunity for ﬂight  1 to cheat about the true value of its delay to get a higher proﬁt. Let
 ′
1  be the false value of the delay cost displayed by ﬂight  1 for slot  , and  ′
 , ′
  and  ′
1 be the corresponding
modiﬁed slot prices and proﬁt for ﬂight  1, respectively.
Flight  1 ( 2) has a nonnegative proﬁt in selling its slot   ( ) and purchasing the other slot   ( ) at prices
   (  ) and    (  ), respectively. In particular,
 1 =  1  −  1  +    −   
 2 =  2  −  2  +    −   
where    and    are the optimal solutions of the following problem, the dual of problem (7):
max  =  1 +  2 −    −   
 1 −    ≤ 0
 1 −    ≤  1 
 2 −    ≤ 0 (13)
 2 −    ≤  2 
 1, 2,  ,   ≥ 0
In the (  ,  ) space the optimal region is  1  ≤   −   ≤  2 . This optimal region has only two ﬁnite vertices,
i.e., (   =  1 ,   = 0) and (   =  2 ,   = 0). Using a standard algorithm, as the simplex or the dual simplex
algorithm, to solve problem (13), the optimal solution is always point (   =  1 ,   = 0). Hence the proﬁt of
ﬂight  1 in selling its slot   at price    =  1  and purchasing the slot   at price    = 0 is  1 = 0− 1 + 1 −0 = 0.
As long as  ′
1  ≤  2  the slot allocation remains the same. Hence the optimal region is  ′
1  ≤  ′
  −  ′
  ≤  2 .
Then the optimal solution obtained by the simplex algorithm is ( ′
  =  ′
1 , ′
  = 0). Hence the modiﬁed proﬁt
16is  ′
1 =  1  −  1  +  ′
  −  ′
  = 0 −  1  +  ′
1  − 0. Then  ′
1 −  1 =  ′
1  −  1 . Then if 0 ≤  ′
1  <  1  it follows that
 ′
1− 1 < 0, and if  1  <  ′
1  <  2  we have  ′
1− 1 > 0. When  ′
1  >  2 , the slot allocation changes and becomes
identical to the      allocation. Hence in this case  ′
1 = 0.
As the value  2  is not known to ﬂight  1, we conclude that the ﬂight taking the ﬁrst slot under the     
allocation knows that it does not have to display a false delay cost lower that the true one because this choice
may lead to a proﬁt  ′
1 lower than the true proﬁt  1. On the other side, if this ﬂight  1 communicates to the
ATM authority a false delay cost  ′
1  higher than the true one, the proﬁt  ′
1 it gets is higher than or equal to
the true proﬁt  1. Then our mechanism is not incentive compatible because there is no disadvantage for the
ﬁrst ﬂight in the      allocation to appropriately misrepresent its delay costs.
We remind that these ﬁndings assume that ﬂights know in advance which is the vertex of the optimal region
of problem (13) chosen by the solving algorithm. On the contrary, when we consider as slot prices a generic
pair of optimal values (  ,   ) the corresponding proﬁt  1 can be strictly positive, as MM is by construction
individual rational. In this situation, it can be risky for ﬂight  1 to cheat about its cost of delay  1 . In fact, if
it sets its false value  ′
1  strictly larger than  2  its proﬁt  ′
1 is equal to 0. Since  2  is unknown to ﬂight  1, a
misrepresentation of its cost of delay may produce a proﬁt  ′
1 lower than the true  1.
We conclude that when we do not know in advance which are the optimal slot values, we are unable to
identify up to which limit a false value of the delay cost does not lead to a proﬁt  ′
1 <  1.
17